The volume documents, and makes an original contribution to, an astonishing period in twentieth-century philosophy—the progress of Arne Naess's ecophilosophy from its inception to the present. It includes Naess's most crucial polemics with leading thinkers, drawn from sources as diverse as scholarly articles, correspondence, TV interviews and unpublished exchanges. The book testifies to the skeptical and self-correcting aspects of Naess's vision, which has deepened and broadened to include third world and feminist perspectives. Philosophical Dialogues is an essential addition to the (...) literature on environmental philosophy. (shrink)

During the 1992–1993 academic year, Harold Garfinkel offered a graduate seminar on Ethnomethodology in the Sociology Department at the University of California, Los Angeles. One topic that was given extensive coverage in the seminar has not been discussed at much length in Garfinkel’s published works to date: Aron Gurwitsch’s treatment of Gestalt theory, and particularly the themes of “phenomenal field” and “praxeological description”. The edited transcript of Garfinkel’s seminar shows why he recommended that “for the serious initiatives of ethnomethodological (...) investigations […] Gurwitsch is a theorist we can’t do without”. Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological “misreading” is not a mistaken reading, but is more a matter of taking Gurwitsch’s phenomenological demonstrations of Gestalt contextures in phenomenal fields and transposing them for making detailed, concrete observations and descriptions of organizationally achieved social phenomena. Where Gurwitsch addresses the organization of perception as an autochthonous achievement, inherent to the stream and field of individual consciousness, Garfinkel extends and elaborates this field into the social world of enacted practices. The April 1993 seminar also is rich with brief asides and digressions in which Garfinkel comments about his use of Alfred Schutz, his attitude toward publishing, his relationship with Erving Goffman, and many other matters. (shrink)

This anthology on creativity represents a lifetime of reading and study by the late Charles Dewey Tenney, a philosopher who had been a student of Alfred North Whitehead at Harvard. In a series of fourteen essays Tenney considers the various factors that can be identified in creativity, followed by the recorded testimony of philosophers, artists, historians, explorers, scientists and others, both theorists and practitioners. The contributors extend in time from Aristotle and Sophocles to Buckminster Fuller and May Sarton. They (...) include such diverse thinkers as Martin Luther, Karl Marx, Lewis Carroll, Julian Huxley, Albert Einstein, Abraham Lincoln, Gertrude Stein, Henry Nelson Wieman and Alfred North Whitehead. In all, more than 300 of the world's most creative individuals are included. Contents: Discovery, Invention and Creation; Roots of Discovery; Environs of Discovery; Agents of Discovery; Hinderances to Discovery; Observation and Discovery; Reason in Discovery; Reverie Discovery; Imagination in Discovery; Sensibility and Discovery; Method in Discovery; Artistry in Discovery; Diffusion; and Foresight and Discovery. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:408 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Fellowship of Being. By John B. O'Malley. (The Hague: Martinus Niihoff, 1966. Pp. xii + 140. $5.60) This book is a study of the concept of person in the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel. It is the revision of a doctoral thesis, completed at the University of London, under the direction of A. J. Ayer. This fact, in addition to the intrinsic interest of the (...) subject, gives the volume special interest, for it is one of an increasing number of essays establishing dialogue between British analytic interests and continental phenomenology. John B. O'Malley is well aware of current analytic concerns and frequently notes the relevance of Marcel's analysis to these issues. It is even argued that Marcel anticipated numerous concerns which became central in analytic philosophy includingproblems of language. O'Malley proposes that the person is the central and guiding concept in Marcel's philosophy and that his analysis of this phenomenon allows him to escape Idealism and ghost theories, and to reconcile the moral and the metaphysical viewpoints. It is to the person that bodily or mental predicates are applied. Consequently this concept is fundamental to the analysis of body-mind problems. It is this reality which offers the nonlinguisticreferent to which such predication may apply. An adequate analysis of person must not abstract from its subject matter but rather must include the person in "an act of reflective withdrawal." This is central in Marcers methodology, and thus the epistemology of the person is neither "acquaintance with" nor "knowledge about." The neglect of such involvement results in either extreme objectivism or extreme subjectivism, either of which misses the person. Objectivism replaces the personal with successive states and qualities. Subjectivism results in either solipsism or in a division between an absolute and a particular ego, and thus both lose the concrete and incarnate person. The embodied person is the center of my relationships and thus even ontological analysis must be directed toward it. The analysis cannot be merely problematic but needs to be meta-problematic. The person offers such meta-problematic analysis a meeting point of Being, Truth, and Value, thus overcoming the dichotomy between the moral and the metaphysical and between the normative and the descriptive. Unfortunately the essay could have used a further proof reading for it is marred by numerous printing errors. Although it is somewhat ponderous in style, it is a very carefully argued analysis of what is central to Marcel. To have such a discussion sympathetic to Marcel's perspective and yet written by one quite conscious of British philosophical concerns affords significant insight for the reader into a new stage of contemporary philosophy which is undoubtedly to center upon such conversation across the English channel. HAROLDA. D ~ American University Menschliche Existenz und moderne Welt. Ein internationales Symposion zum Selbstverst~indnis des heutigen Menschen. Hrsg. Richard Schwarz. (Berlin, 1967. Two vols., S. 810 and 885) In der "Einfiihrung" umreisst der tterauageber den Titel des Werkes. Es soil nach dem Selbstverst~indnis des Menschen gefragt werden, das heiflt, worin sieht der heutige Mensch die besondere Eigenheit seines Menschseins, sein "Epochalbewul~tsoin" (Litt). Gibt es gewisse Grundbefindliehkeiten,die MienMensehen gemeinsamsind? Kann noch yon einer gemeinsamen Wertwelt gesproehen werden? Sind dieses nicht infolge einer inneren Bedrohung nur fiberholte Gedanken? Das Werk soll die Antwort geben. Es ist nicht mSglich, alle in dem Buch aufgenommene Aufs~tze zu behandeln, mSgen sic auch gewinnreiche Beitr~ige sein. Datum muff eine gewisse Auswabl getroffen werden. Zu Beginn des Werkes spricht der leider verstorbene Eduard Spranger fiber den "Humanit ~tsgedanken", den er unter dem dreifachen Aspekt der Humanit~t als Bildung, als ethischpolitischen Begriff und als religiSs-ethischen Begriff wiedergibt. Bildung ist nicht blofl Tradi- BOOK REVIEWS 409 tion, sondern immer neue lebendige Durehdringung, Gelstesformung, nicht nur Grammatik. Humanitat fordert ethisch-politische Freiheit als Voranssetzung der Personentfaltung, ist darum mehr als blofie Nfitzlichkeit und verlangt Anerkennung des Lebensreehts anderer V61ker. Nach Spranger gibt es einen religiSs-ehristlichen Humanismus im Gegensatz zur "Theologie der Krisis". Er steht in Verbindung mit dem Weltsein, verleiht ihm den letzten transzendenten Bezug und fordert "echte Toleranz". Alfred yon Martin-M~nehen erSrtert dann in "Humanitgt als Problem tier Gegenwart" angesichts... (shrink)

Essays and accompanying bibliographies survey recent (to 1990) studies of Boethius' 6th-century Latin work as it was translated into Old English (primarily King Alfred), medieval German, medieval French, and Middle English (primarily Chaucer). Each of the four chapters is an independent treatment, b.

Alfred Schutz''s influence on American sociologists and sociology in the 1960s and 1970s is traced through the examination of the work of two of his students, Helmut Wagner and Peter Berger, and of Harold Garfinkel with whom he met and corresponded over a number of years. The circumstances of Schutz''s own academic situation, particularly the short period of his academic career in the United States and his location at the New School, are examined to consider how and in (...) what ways he was constrained from exerting an even wider influence. The two major areas of influence in American sociology that are examined are the sociology of knowledge and the early development of ethnomethodology. (shrink)

The epistemological problem of objectivism in the production of sociological knowledge confronts the researcher with the question of the risk involved in substituting social reality by the idealizations and abstractions created by science. Without a doubt, the subject seems intriguing and requires its thematization facing toward and appropriate foundation of sociological concepts. In order to address that problem, the article aims to recover, from a hermeneutic perspective, a phenomenologically inspired epistemology in the works of Alfred Schutz and Harold (...) Garfinkel. To achieve this goal we first analyse Schutzian contributions in the context of the correspondence held with Talcott Parsons. There the author thoroughly discusses the difficulties that social sciences go through regarding the foundation of its concepts. Secondly, we revise unpublished bibliographical heritage from Garfinkel’s work who -interested in the epistemological debate between Schutz and Parsons- picks up the epistemological problem again. We will sustain that unlike Schutz who proposes a philosophical response consisting in the articulation of an ontology of the life-world, Garfinkel develops a methodological answer which aims to illuminate the practical reasoning and the methodological decisions of researchers in order to avoid the substitution of social reality by the idealities of the scientific reflection. El problema epistemológico del objetivismo en la producción de conocimiento sociológico confronta al investigador con la pregunta acerca del riesgo que conlleva la sustitución de la realidad social por las idealidades y las abstracciones creadas por la ciencia. A fin de abordar ese problema, el artículo se propone recuperar, desde una perspectiva hermenéutica, una epistemología de inspiración fenomenológica en los textos de Alfred Schutz y de Harold Garfinkel. Para ello se analizan, en primer lugar, los aportes de Schutz en la correspondencia mantenida con Talcott Parsons pues es allí donde el autor discute ampliamente las dificultades por las que atraviesan las ciencias sociales con relación a la fundamentación de sus conceptos. En segundo lugar, se revisan acervos bibliográficos inéditos de la obra de Garfinkel quien, interesado por el debate epistemológico entre Schutz y Parsons, retoma ese mismo problema epistemológico. Sostendremos que, a diferencia de Schutz quien propone una salida filosófica que consiste en la articulación de una ontología del mundo de la vida, Garfinkel elabora una respuesta de carácter metodológico que apunta a iluminar los razonamientos prácticos y las decisiones metodológicas de los investigadores a fin de evitar la sustitución de la realidad social por las idealidades de la reflexión científica. (shrink)

The work of Alfred Schutz was an important early influence on Harold Garfinkel and therefore on the development of ethnomethodology. In this article, I try to clarify what Garfinkel drew from Schutz, as well as what he did not take from him, specifically as regards the task of social inquiry. This is done by focusing in detail on one of Schutz’s key articles: ‘Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences’. The aim is thereby to illuminate the relationship (...) between Schutz’s views on the character of social science and Garfinkel’s radical proposal for a re-specified focus of investigation. This is further pursued by examining an important debate about the link between Schutz and ethnomethodology. (shrink)

This paper examines the “methodology,” or philosophy of social science, developed by Felix Kaufmann in the second quarter of the 20th century, with the aim of determining its influence on the early work of the sociologist Harold Garfinkel. Kaufmann’s two methodology books are discussed, one written before, the other after, his migration from Austria to the United States. It is argued that Garfinkel took over Kaufmann’s conception of scientific practice: as a set of procedural rules or methods that determine (...) whether or not new propositions will be accepted into the corpus of scientific knowledge, and whether previously accepted propositions should be retained or abandoned. However, Garfinkel deployed this methodology not so much as a model for sociological inquiry, but rather for the processes by which the lifeworld is constituted—an area of investigation that is epistemologically prior to the focus of most social science, and one which had been opened up in the writings of Edmund Husserl and (especially) Alfred Schutz. It is suggested that Kaufmann’s “methodology” was an important complement to the work of these other two philosophers in their influence on Garfinkel. (shrink)

The paper aims to analyze the potentiality of Schutzian phenomenology to account for the problem of social order. Firstly, we expose the existence of an interpretive scheme of Parsonian roots in contemporary social theory that introduces the dualistic dilemma subjective action versus social order in the analysis of Schutz’s perspective. According to this interpretive scheme, Schutz fails to master the problem of social order. Secondly, and in clear opposition to those interpretations, we show three main contributions which have put forward (...) the argument that it is possible to find in Schutz’s work a theory of social order: Harold Garfinkel’s early writings, the recent Austrian School of Economics’ reception of Schutz and the present-day interpretation in German sociology. In the context of these discussions, our reflections have explored the pragmatic dimension of the order of the life-world based on a phenomenonological constitutive analysis which provides a basis for a comprehensive theory of social order of Schutzian roots. (shrink)

Este ensayo parte de una experiencia disruptiva en un aula de bachillerato de un instituto español. En el transcurso de una clase ordinaria de filosofía, un incidente inesperado rompe la definición de la situación, haciendo añicos el consenso de trabajo entre los alumnos y el profesor. Para reconstruir su trasfondo de expectativas, los alumnos se ven forzados a emplear estrategias de acomodación y normalización. En el análisis de esta experiencia disruptiva convergen la fenomenología del mundo social de Alfred Schütz, (...) la etnometodología de Harold Garfinkel y el interaccionismo simbólico de Erving Goffman.This essay starts from a disruptive experience in a Spanish high school classroom. In the course of an ordinary philosophy lesson, an unexpected incident breaks the definition of the situation, smashing the working consensus among students and teacher to smithereens. In order to rebuild their background expectancies, the pupils are forced to resort to accommodation and normalization strategies. The analysis of this disruptive experience is based upon the convergence of Alfred Schütz’s phenomenology of the social world, Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, and Erving Goffman’s symbolic interactionism. (shrink)

Democracies have a problem with expertise. Expert knowledge both mediates and facilitates public apprehension of problems, yet it also threatens to exclude the public from consequential judgments and decisions located in technical domains. This book asks: how can we have inclusion without collapsing the very concept of expertise? How can public judgment be engaged in expert practices in a way that does not reduce to populism? Drawing on deliberative democratic theory and social studies of science, Critical Elitism argues that expert (...) authority depends ultimately on the exercise of public judgment in a context in which there are live possibilities for protest, opposition and scrutiny. This account points to new ways of looking at the role of civil society, expert institutions, and democratic innovations in the constitution of expert authority within democratic systems. Using the example of climate science, Critical Elitism highlights not only the risks but also the benefits of contesting expertise. (shrink)

Published with the aid of a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Contains the only complete English-language text of The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages. Tarski made extensive corrections and revisions of the original translations for this edition, along with new historical remarks. It includes a new preface and a new analytical index for use by philosophers and linguists as well as by historians of mathematics and philosophy.

The central importance of Marx's concept of nature in the formulation of historical materialism has been largely neglected in the extensive literature on Marx. Alfred Schmidt, philosophical successor to Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in Frankfurt, seeks to elucidate it in this original study.

My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic. That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free (...) will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. Compatibilists argue for compatibility, and incompatibilists argue against it. Some incompatibilists maintain that free will and moral responsibility are illusions. But most are libertarians, libertarianism being the conjunction of incompatibilism and the thesis that at least some human beings are possessed of free will and moral responsibility. (shrink)

Since the 1950s, Lee Joseph of Zhu Xi of the Road, learn to criticism that many aspects of Taoism is similar to Whitehead's qualification process philosophy, which Zhu large amount of philosophical comprehensive work is the right assessment, triggering In order to controversy . This paper argues that there are many real reason is that Zhu and Whitehead都qualification processes philosopher. According to Whitehead's thought, emphasizing the role or function of qualifications process description is the qualification process may philosopher. Zhu Xi (...) said in his clear emphasis on learning裡qualification process, change, transformation and innovation of other concepts. Description of this method less controversial, but the problem is in the end "qualification process" concept in terms of how important Zhu? He has "qualification process" concept is obvious? Over the past eight hundred years have an ongoing controversy, Zhu Xi Road School for the qualification process as the subject is so obvious? Zhu Xi describes the nature of the universe is life and life does not interest, is well known. However, many scholars have argued Zhu Xi's description of the main school - "Management", or the original management, channel management, pattern, or order, in fact, is a static concept. If "management" is static or just the original order or pattern in the form of management, it is difficult to establish qualification process is a description of the key themes of philosophy. Like a dead Yuzhe how it is possible to control a horse living ? This is a serious topic, in fact, followed by South Korean scholars to discuss the subject, which launched the great "forty-seven Debate." This article will certainly "reasonable" can indeed be interpreted as a life principle of management by a manager or management Concept. Really the case, said Zhu Xi's learning can rightly be regarded as a strongly significant qualification process philosophy, such as Whitehead and Lee Snow and other scholars advocated. Zhu Xi to provide In order many of the "reasonable" interpretation, possible these things in the world or the events of the original treatment or reason, interpreted with the qualification process in nature, even creative, with its complex of Taoist system role. This will be Chen Chun highly influential book of the "North Creek word meaning" to prove the wisdom of philosophy of Zhu Xi's disciples will be the most "reasonable" as a "way of qualifications." Therefore, based on an important school of Zhu Xi's interpretation of Taoism, we can agree and support the Joseph Lee, Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism as the philosophy of the Core see qualification process. Ever since Joseph Needham in the 1950s made the comment that in many ways the daoxue of Zhu Xi resembled the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead there has been a debate on whether or not this is an accurate assessment of the Master Zhu's massive philosophical synthesis. This paper argues that there are substantive grounds to suggest that both Master Zhu and Whitehead are process philosophers. Based on Whitehead's observation that some philosophers emphasize the role or function or process as a key element of their philosophical vision and hence can be deemed 'process' philosophers, it is clear that Zhu certainly affirmed a central place for notions of process, change, transformation and creativity within his daoxue or Teaching of the Way. In many ways there is little argument about the general nature of this comment: the problem is, just how central to Zhu's daoxue is the notion of process? Is process more apparent than real? There has been a constant debate for the last eight hundred years as to whether or not Zhu Xi's commitment to process as a central theme or motif of daoxue is as strong as it appears at first glance. Zhu was famous for saying that the nature of the cosmos is, for instance, constant generation or shengsheng buxi life and life does not interest rates. Nonetheless, many competent scholars have argued that Zhu's crucial notion of li management or principle, rationale, pattern, or order might actually be a static concept: hardly the kind of key theme to build a process philosophy around if indeed it is the case that principle is a static or merely a formal principle of order or pattern . One of the best ways of putting the question was, how can a dead rider ride a live horse ? This is a serious question, and in fact later Korean scholars debated the issue with great subtlety in the great Four-Seven Debate. This paper will defend the notion that li can indeed be interpreted as a living principle or rationale. If this is the case, then Zhu's daoxue can be rightly deemed a process philosophy in the strongest sense of the term as defined by scholars such as Whitehead and Nicholas Rescher. Although Zhu Xi offered a number of different interpretations of li, it is entirely plausible that principle or the rationale for the things and events of the world can be construed as processive, even creative in terms of its role in the complex daoxue architectonic. For instance, the influential Beixi ziyi [or Neo-Confucian Terms Explained as translated by Wing-tsit Chan] of Chen Chun proves that one of Master Zhu's most philosophically astute disciples understood li to be proccessive. Therefore, based on one important stream of exegesis of Zhu's daoxue, we can agree with and support Joseph Needham's insight that daoxue is a form of process philosophy. (shrink)

The struggles that Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch, Harold Garfinkel, and other social phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists have had with Edmund Husserl’s progenitive but inconsistent notion of intersubjectivity are summarized and assessed. In particular, an account of Schutz’s objections to intersubjective constitution is presented. The commonly pervading elements and major differences within this lineage of inquiry – a four generation-long lineage of teacher and student that commences with Husserl, runs through Schutz and Gurwitsch, then Garfinkel, and then the present author (...) and his colleagues – are discussed, under the advisory (as suggested by Maurice Natanson) that what Husserl sought was more important than what he found. (shrink)

This classic text in American Philosophy by one of the foremost figures in American philosophy offers a concise analysis of the various factors in human nature which go toward forming a religion, to exhibit the inevitable transformation of religion with the transformation of knowledge and to direct attention to the foundation of religion on our apprehension of those permanent elements by reason of which there is a stable order in the world, permanent elements apart from which there could be no (...) changing world. (shrink)

This article has two aims: to articulate the main lines of argument for Libet's and Wegner's theses, and to survey philosophical responses in the present century to the argumentation. Because a proper understanding of the scientific argumentation at issue requires attention to a raft of data and the experiments that generate them, reasonable constraints on space preclude discussion of philosophical responses before 2000.

I claim that there are four major strands of argument for externalism and set out to discuss three of them. The four are: (A) That referential thoughts are object-dependent. This I do not discuss. (B) That the semantics of natural kind terms is externalist. (C) That all semantic content, even of descriptive terms, stems from the causal relations of representations to the things or properties they designate in the external world. (D) That, because meaning is a social product and no (...) individual can capture the whole social practice that defines a concept, what the speaker means always outruns what he can know.I briefiy discuss (C) and (D) and conclude that they cannot be correct, because, if they were, the content of every thought would permanently transcend the refiective grasp of all thinkers. Then I discuss (B) and conclude that, though Putnam shows something interesting about natural kind terms -- namely that a real verbal definition requires science -- this has none of the consequences for philosophy of mind that it is normally supposed to have. (shrink)

What is the meaning of history? Can we discern its significant stages and developments? Does our past reveal an overall purpose and direction? What light do grand theories and religious visions cast on today's world? Do the patterns enable us to envision humanity's likely future? This book proposes that a new Eye to past, present and future has been offered to humanity. We can now see further and implement more of this universal vision. A new Divine Educator appeared in the (...) nineteenth century, and though humanity's rejection of his guidance led to tragedies and atrocities in the twentieth century, our chastened eyes can adjust to his Light, and we can co-fashion an ever-advancing global civilization. Of course, this uniting in larger embrace will be very challenging. Birth brings intense pain of two kinds - a dying of the old order, and an awkward struggling with the new. Among the Eyes guiding the main chapters of humanity's story have been Abraham, Moses, Krishna, Zoroaster, Buddha, Christ and Muhammad. To these generators of civilization we must now add Baha'u'llah, founder of the Baha'i Faith, empowering humanity to attain moral-spiritual maturity and build a united world. Peerless is this Day, says Baha'u'llah, for it is as the eye to past ages and centuries, and as a light unto the darkness of the times. We offer a five-stage theory of the development of religion and civilization, surveying views of history from Neolithic times onward. We portray the contours of major civilizations, taking a detailed look at the Great Transition from regional empires in the early nineteenth century to the emerging Global Civilization, while offering a providential view of humanity's future. This Day a door is open wider than both heaven and earth, says Baha'u'llah. Let's view world history anew, discovering realistic hope for a just, united and dynamic global community. (shrink)

. I find it impossible to imagine that this book will not remain indefinitely the very best book of its sort."—Review of Metaphysics "The confrontation or conjunction of Ayer and Russell is a notable event and has produced a remarkable ...

Timed for the centennial of Alfred Schutz (1899-1999), this set of original essays documents the continuing relevance of his thought in economics, geography, sociology, philosophy, and political science, and indicates the continuing interest in his thought in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America. The authors of these essays are leading authorities in their countries and disciplines. Schutz is the pre-eminent phenomenological philosopher of the social sciences. New materials from his Nachlaß concerning barriers to equality of opportunity, including a (...) report co-authored with the political scientist Harold Lasswell are also included. (shrink)

It is sometimes suggested that if, whenever we act intentionally, we do, or try to do, what we are most strongly motivated to do at the time, then we are at the mercy of whatever desire happens to be strongest at the time. I have argued elsewhere that this is false (Mele 1987, ch. 5; 1992, ch. 4; 1995, ch. 3; 1996). This essay provides another route to that conclusion, but that is not my primary aim. The goal of this (...) paper is to display the bearing of some well-known experiments by physiologist Benjamin Libet on this issue. Philosophical discussion of these experiments has focused on Libet's claims about consciousness. The significance of these experiments for the topics of motivation and agential control also merits serious attention. (shrink)

A major point of dispute among libertarian theorists and thinkers today as always revolves around the age—old question of whether man can live in total anarchy or whether the minimal state is absolutely necessary for the maximization of freedom. Lost in this dispute is the question of whether man is capable of getting out of anarchy at all. Can we really abolish anarchy and set up a Government in its place? Most people, regardless of their ideological preferences, simply assume that (...) the abolition of anarchy is possible, that they live under Government and that anarchy would be nothing but chaos and violence}. (shrink)

In this chapter, drawing partly on some attractions to soft libertarianism and on a libertarian approach articulated in Mele (1996) to accommodating successful Frankfurt-style cases, I motivate the thesis that at least some human beings sometimes act freely than that no human being ever acts freely.

The basic subject matter of the philosophy of action is a pair of questions: (1) What are actions? (2) How are actions to be explained? The questions call, respectively, for a theory of the nature of action and a theory of the explanation of actions. Donald Davidson has articulated and defended influential answers to both questions. Those answers are the primary focus of this chapter.

Autonomy, as I understand it, is associated with a family of freedom concepts: free will, free choice, free action, and the like. In much of the philosophical literature discussed in this chapter, issues are framed in terms of freedom rather than autonomy, but we are talking about (aspects of) the same thing. Libertarians argue that determinism precludes autonomy by, for example, precluding an agent's being ultimately responsible for anything. Some compatibilist believers in autonomy argue that libertarians rely on indeterminism in (...) a way that deprives us of autonomy-level control over our decisions. Theorists who contend that no human being is autonomous can benefit from arguments on both sides, alleging that libertarians decisively reveal the ordinary person's notion of autonomy, an incompatibilist notion, and that compatibilist critics of libertarianism show that the notion is incoherent or unsatis-fiable. Is there a way to use the resources both of libertarianism and of compatibilism in defending the following thesis: The claim that there are autonomous human beings is more credible than the claim that there are none? -/- I believe that the answer is “yes.” I defended that answer in Autonomous Agents. Part of my strategy was to develop an account of an ideally self-controlled agent (where self-control is understood as the contrary of akrasia [roughly, weakness of will]), to argue that even such an agent may fall short of autonomy, and to ask what may be added to ideal self-control to yield autonomy. I offered two answers, one for compatibilists and another for libertarians. I then argued that a certain disjunctive thesis involving both answers (identified in Section 4 below) is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. (shrink)

My topic is recent scientific skepticism about free will. A leading argument for such skepticism features the proposition—defended by Daniel Wegner (2002, 2008) and Benjamin Libet (1985, 2004) among others that conscious intentions (and their physical correlates) never play a role in producing corresponding overt actions. This chapter examines alleged scientific evidence for the truth of this proposition.

Can there be a duty to forgive those who have wronged us? According to a popular view amongst philosophers working on forgiveness the answer is no. Forgiveness, it is claimed, is always elective. This view is rejected by Gamlund (2010a; 2010b) who argues that duties to forgive do exist and then provides conditions that are relevant to determining whether forgiveness is obligatory or supererogatory. In this paper I will argue that the conditions that Gamlund provides do not provide a plausible (...) account of the connection between forgiveness and duty. The problems I will raise against Gamlund’s view is a problem that faces any moral view that makes room for supererogation. I will then investigate whether the existing solutions to this problem provide a more plausible account of the connection between forgiveness and obligation. I will argue that the two most prominent solutions, The Favouring Reasons View and The Sacrifice View, produce implausible results when applied to the case of forgiveness. However, an alternative view, The Freedom View, can provide plausible results when applied to the case of forgiveness. This gives us defeasible reason to favour this as a general solution to The Problem of the Good Ought Tie-Up. (shrink)